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EMASCULATING THE DEFENSE IN OBSCENITY CASES:
THE EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
AND SURVEY EVIDENCE ON
COMMUNITY STANDARDS
I. INTRODUCTION
If defining obscenity was a thorny task for the United States
Supreme Court in Miller v. California, ' the aftermath of that decision
has become an even deeper thicket. The Supreme Court thought it had
solved the obscenity quandary in 1973 with the Miller test,2 which estab-
lished that obscenity would be measured by local, rather than national,
standards.' But the Court failed to envision that the "community" could
become an unwieldy unit of measure in decades to come, and that the
test's "standards" may be elusive-or even illusory.
Miller provided a false sense of security for the courts: what ap-
peared to be a neat and tidy test created more problems than it solved.
The test did not define the relevant community, nor did it provide guide-
lines for proving the standards of that community. Miller's legacy has
been seventeen years of confusion for state and federal courts struggling
with the evidentiary issues that lay lurking in the community standards
test.
Such a dilemma arose recently in United States v. Pryba,4 a federal
racketeering prosecution for the interstate sale of allegedly obscene
videos and magazines. The district court defined the community as its
jurisdictional area.' The defendants intended to prove the standards of
that community through expert testimony, comparable materials and an
opinion poll.6 Although these are arguably the most effective and com-
monly used tools in obscenity cases, the court refused to allow the de-
fendants to use them.
1. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2. Material is obscene and loses first amendment protection when the factfinder con-
cludes that: the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; the work describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined; and the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, political or scientific value. Id. at 24.
3. Id. at 33-34.
4. 678 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1988).
5. Id. at 1232. The court defined the relevant community as the "adult community" in
the Alexandria Division of the Eastern District of Virginia. Id.
6. Id. at 1226.
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The Pryba case brings to light the Pandora's box opened by the
Miller test: if one can pass the somewhat difficult threshold issue of de-
termining the relevant community, what evidence is necessary to prove
the standards of that community?
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 13, 1987, Virginia bookstore/videostore owners Dennis
and Barbara Pryba, along with their employee, Jennifer Williams, were
indicted on ten RICO violations.7 These were based on the interstate
rental or sale of allegedly obscene materials contained in four videotapes
and nine magazines. An additional RICO charge against the Prybas'
corporation, Educational Books, Inc., rested on fifteen obscenity pleas or
convictions of the corporation under Virginia law from 1981 to 1984.8
On the basis of these "patterns of racketeering activity,"9 the Govern-
ment sought forfeiture of nearly all the Prybas' assets."°
The Prybas' troubles had been a long time coming. Dennis Pryba
had first been convicted for selling obscene material nineteen years ear-
lier. 1  After a tour in the Navy, he moved from his native Midwest to the
Washington, D.C. area, where he began to build a pornography business
in the 1960s. 12
Pryba's enterprise gradually expanded. In 1973, Dennis Pryba
opened Educational Books in a shopping center on the Richmond High-
way in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 3 Soon afterward, local authorities began
targeting Pryba with obscenity charges in an effort to close down his
enterprise. Unsuccessful because of jurisdictional problems, 4 the county
eventually sought help from the federal government-which was more
than happy to oblige.
7. Hayes, A Jury Wrestles With Pornography, AM. LAW. 98 (March 1988) [hereinafter 'A
Jury Wrestles"].
8. Id. at 98-99.
9. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), "racketeering activity" includes "any act which is in-
dictable" under the obscenity prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 1461-1465. The Prybas were con-
victed under 18 U.S.C. § 1465, which prohibits the transportation of obscene matters for sale
or distribution. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1228, n.4. A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires
two or more acts of racketeering. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
10. A Jury Wrestles at 98-99. See also, Appellants' Opening Brief at 3, United States v.
Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1988) (Nos. 88-5001(L), 88-5002, 88-5003, 88-5004).
11. A Jury Wrestles at 98.
12. Id. Pryba once described himself as "just a businessman selling smut"; "Everybody is
renting it ... every mom and pop has opened a video store and has this stuff." Id.
13. Id.
14. A Jury Wrestles at 98. The Prybas did not reside in the jurisdiction. A prosecutor on
the case once lamented: "[W]e could never get them on the premises [to arrest them] when the
material was sold." Id.
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The United States Attorney's Office agreed to look into Pryba's ac-
tivities, and was bolstered with help from the United States Department
of Justice's recently formed National Obscenity Enforcement Unit. Un-
dercover FBI agents were dispatched on a number of "shopping sprees"
to Educational Books. ' 5
On October 9, 1986, FBI agents raided Dennis Pryba's warehouse in
Upper Marlboro, Virginia, and Barbara Pryba's 20-acre estate in Lorton,
Virginia.' 6 An inventory was prepared by agents, which indicated that
the number of general-interest videos found in the search far outnum-
bered the amount of sexually explicit videos on the warehouse
premises. 17
A. Maneuverings at Trial Level
At trial, investigator Daniel B. Garrett III testified that as part of
the obscenity investigation he had rented three sexually explicit video-
tapes from one of Pryba's eight Video Rental Centers and that he
purchased an adult videotape from Educational Books. 8 Postal inspec-
tor Joseph Lee Edwards testified that on August 10, 1987, he purchased
packages containing nine sexually explicit magazines from Educational
Books. "
In his scathing opinion, Federal District Judge T. S. Ellis III ex-
pressed a clear revulsion toward these materials.2" He noted that the
content of most of the magazines and some of the videos was sado-maso-
chistic in nature.2 His opinion described each film in excruciating-and
arguably unnecessary---detail. 22
15. Id. FBI agents bought about 20 magazines and 40 videotapes from Educational Books
before charges were brought. Id.
16. Id.
17. Appellants' Opening Brief at 4, Pryba.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. The judge pointedly observed: "Not sur-
prisingly, defendants did not argue at trial that the materials possessed serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value." Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1228 n. 4.
A writer who interviewed six of the Pryba jurors after the verdict noted that Judge Ellis
was a Reagan appointee who had recently been elevated to the federal bench. Therefore, it was
anticipated that Judge Ellis was "likely to share the administration's position [against] pornog-
raphy." See A Jury Wrestles at 98. Moreover, the writer observed that the "odds were against
the Prybas before they stepped through the courthouse doors"-the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia is nicknamed the "Rocket Docket" because of its reputation for "dispensing speedy jus-
tice and decisions favorable to the government." Id.
21. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1227.
22. Id. at 1227-28. The court's description includes, among other acts: "she-males" (with
female breasts and male genitalia) engaged in fellatio and anal intercourse; group sex; the
1990]
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The jury examined the materials and found that the four videotapes
and six of the magazines were obscene.2" On that basis, the jury con-
victed the Prybas and Jennifer Williams-who was their bookkeeper and
an officer of the corporation--of three counts of racketeering and seven
counts of distributing obscene materials.24 Based on those convictions
and on Educational Books' RICO conviction, the jury voted to allow the
Government to seize nearly all the Prybas' assets (excluding Barbara
Pryba's home and automobile).25 The Government immediately pad-
locked the doors of the three bookstores and the nine video rental shops.
Ironically, the conviction was for distributing only $105.30 worth of ob-
scene materials.26
On December 18, 1987, Judge Ellis sentenced Dennis Pryba to three
years in prison, a fine of $75,000, five years' probation and 300 hours of
community service.27 The judge said he considered the sentence "lenient
for a life of selling pornography" and alluded to Pryba's "23-year history
of selling smut."28 Dennis' estranged wife, Barbara Pryba, received a
three-year suspended sentence and a $200,000 fine.29
B. Contentions on Appeal
On appeal to the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,3"
the Prybas challenged the forfeiture as an unconstitutional confiscation
and restraint of a large inventory of presumptively protected expressive
material, most of which was not even sexually explicit. The conviction
was appealed on several grounds, two of which present major evidentiary
issues that go to the heart of the Miller community standards test: the
exclusion of expert testimony and opinion survey evidence.
drinking of male ejaculate from a glass; urination; painful positions of forced bondage for long
periods of time; sticking pins into female breasts; inserting vegetables into the vagina; flagella-
tion; mousetraps and tourniquet devices on female breasts; closeups of young women mastur-
bating; inserting a large pipe into a woman's anus; and pregnant women in lascivious poses.
Id.
23. Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Pryba.
24. A Jury Wrestles at 100.
25. Id. at 101.
26. Id. at 97. When jurors read local newspaper accounts of the conviction the next day,
they were shocked to learn that their verdict exposed the Prybas to possible prison terms of 95
years and dire financial consequences. Id. As a result of the seizure of his $ 1-million business,
Dennis Pryba is reportedly penniless. Id. at 101.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. A Jury Wrestles at 101.
30. United States v. Pryba, Record Nos. 88-5001(L), 88-5002, 88-5003, 88-5004. Oral ar-
guments were held October 4, 1989. The Fourth Circuit had not rendered its decision as of the
date this publication went to press. (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S.App. file).
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The trial court had excluded crucial defense evidence, including a
public opinion survey and the testimony of an expert under whose direc-
tion the poll was conducted. Dr. John McConahay, who has a Ph.D. in
social psychology and is an associate professor of policy sciences at Duke
University, al was called by the defense to testify about the poll's results. a2
Judge Ellis barred his testimony, although Dr. McConahay had pre-
viously been qualified as an expert on public opinion poll research more
than 30 times in various state and federal courts.33 The judge ruled that
the survey was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and potentially
prejudicial, confusing and misleading to the jury.
3 4
The judge took particular exception to the specific questions posed
and held that they were irrelevant.35 Interviewees were asked the follow-
ing questions:
36
-whether he/she thought that the portrayal of "nudity
and sex" and materials available to adults only had become
more or less acceptable in recent years;
-whether he/she agreed or disagreed with the statement
that adults who want to should be able to obtain and view
materials depicting "nudity and sex";
-whether he/she believed that he should be able to buy or
rent materials depicting "nudity and sex"; and
-whether he/she agreed or disagreed with the statement
that adults who want to should not be able to buy or rent
materials depicting "nudity and sex."
Before asking these questions, the pollster informed each inter-
viewee that the phrase "nudity and sex" meant "nude bodies and
closeup, graphic depictions of a variety of sexual activities, including sex-
ual intercourse, ejaculation, bondage, oral sex, anal sex, group sex and
variations of these by adult performers."37
The judge found that these questions were not designed to elicit
31. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1228 n.5.
32. Appellants' Opening Brief at 31-32, Pryba.
33. Id.
34. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1231. Yet based upon comments by six jurors in an interview
after the verdict, the exclusion of this evidence may have created far more confusion: "The
jurors understood that strict adherence to the Miller test required them to put aside their
personal opinions.... Since they had no expert opinion or community surveys to guide them,
they judged the magazines and videotapes through the eyes of their parents, relatives and
neighbors." A Jury Wrestles at 99.
35. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1228-30.
36. Appellants' Opening Brief at 33, Pryba
37. Id.
1990]
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whether there was community acceptance of the materials in question.38
Rather, he ruled, the questions inquired about the interviewees' individ-
ual acceptance of sexually explicit materials, which is irrelevant.39 Fur-
ther, Judge Ellis held that the questions were not comparable to the
materials in question because "descriptive language fails to convey the
impact of the visual image."'
The trial court also excluded an "ethnography" 4 study and the tes-
timony of another expert who conducted the study. Dr. Joseph Scott is a
sociologist, criminologist and associate professor at Ohio State Univer-
sity with a background in statistical methodology.42 He conducted an
ethnographic study of the attitudes of the adult community of the Alex-
andria Division toward sexually explicit material.43 Dr. Scott conducted
the study by visiting adult bookstores, drugstores, newsstands, grocery
stores, candy and gift shops, and general bookstores. At each location,
he found sexually explicit magazines and/or videotapes which he deter-
mined were comparable to those in question. He also spoke with clerks
at each store and with newspaper editors regarding letters to the editor
on the topic of pornography."
Judge Ellis, however, was patently unimpressed with this undertak-
ing. He branded Dr. Scott's study as "nothing more than a one-man,
eight-day unscientific poll of purveyors and purchasers of smut. To per-
mit this so-called 'study' to masquerade as expert testimony on Northern
Virginia's contemporary community standards of obscenity is
ludicrous."45
The particular wording of the judge's instructions to the jury deliv-
ered the death blow to the defense. Judge Ellis told the jury to determine
whether the average person in the community would find that the materi-
38. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
39. Id. at 1230-31. See also, People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App.3d 196, 43 Ill. Dec. 476, 410
N.E.2d 476 (1980).
40. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1229.
41. Ethnography is defined as a branch of anthropology that deals descriptively with spe-
cific cultures. Webster's New World Dictionary 481 (2d ed. 1980).
42. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1232.
43. Id. Dr. Scott explained that an ethnographic study of community standards is a "rec-
ognized methodology for making a qualitative assessment of community standards in a given
area." Appellants' Opening Brief at 41, Pryba.
44. Appellants' Opening Brief at 41-42, Pryba.
45. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1234. The Government exhibited a similar attitude, arguing in
its appellate brief that "asking the clientele of an adult bookstore if they like pornography is
like asking the clientele of McDonald's if they like hamburgers." Appellee's Opening Brief at
41, Pryba. Curiously, Dr. Scott testified that the United States Department of Justice had once
requested him to prepare a proposal to do an ethnographic study for the department. Appel-
lants' Opening Brief at 41, Pryba.
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als in question had prurient appeal and were patently offensive.4 6 He
defined prurient as a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or ex-
cretion" that "substantially" exceeds "customary limits of candor."1
47
The jury was told that depicting sexual acts in a degrading manner is
patently offensive.48
Further, the judge refused to instruct the jury to disregard any effect
the material may have on sexual deviates. 49 Additionally, he instructed
the jury that it was to determine whether the materials in question vio-
lated contemporary community standards based upon "what is, in fact,
accepted in the adult community as a whole, and not by what the com-
munity merely tolerates."5°  Citing conflicting case law regarding
whether the correct test is "tolerance" or "acceptance," the appellants
argued on appeal that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury.
They maintained that this "war of words"'" regarding the community
standards test was improperly interpreted against them.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE COMMUNITY STANDARDS TEST
The term "community standards" was coined more than 30 years
ago in the landmark case of Roth v. United States,52 which held that
obscenity is not protected under the first amendment. 3 However, Roth
did not define "community," nor did it indicate that such a definition
was constitutionally required.54
With no guidelines, the courts struggled to define this enigma called
the "community." There was no consensus among lower courts as to
whether the standard should be local, national, or somewhere in be-
46. A Jury Wrestles at 99.
47. Id. The wording was a defeat for defense lawyers, who had argued that community
tolerance-not unusual candor-was the proper standard. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. This social concern about the possible effects of obscenity on crime reportedly
inclined two of the jurors to vote for conviction. Id.
50. Appellants' Opening Brief at 55, Pryba (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 57.
52. 354 U.S. 476 (1954).
53. Id. at 485.
54. See generally, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1954). Jurors in the Pryba case
were instructed: "You [are to] determine [the materials'] impact upon the average person in
the community .... You judge the [materials] by present-day standards of the community.
You may ask yourselves does it offend the common conscience of the community by present-
day standards .... In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the
exclusive judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and in determining that
conscience you are to consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and unedu-
cated, the religious and the irreligious-men, women and children." Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at
490.
1990]
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tween." During the years between Roth in 1957, and Miller in 1973,
state courts applied a panoply of "community" standards: the standards
of the state;56 of the venire;5' and of the locality. 8
Texas rejected a national standard but held the community was "not
smaller than the state."' 59  Louisiana courts equated community stan-
dards with national ones, "unless it is shown ... that the community
standard is not in accord with the national standard."'  Nebraska sensed
the inherent problem in such a test and questioned how jurors in a local
prosecution could be expected to know what the "national standard of
morality" is.
6 1
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit 62 managed to apply a national stan-
dard. The United States Supreme Court impliedly legitimized a national
standard for obscenity in two early cases, Manual Enterprises Inc. v.
Day 63 and Jacobellis v. Ohio. '
However, this jurisdictional patchwork of standards prompted the
United States Supreme Court to settle the issue--or so it thought-in
Miller v. California. 65 The Court rejected national standards and ruled
that obscenity must be judged by "contemporary community
standards.,
66
However, Miller failed to take the next logical step and define "com-
munity." All that was known after Miller-and to this day-is that
community standards do not necessarily equate with national standards.
By ruling in the negative ("A does not equal B"), the Court did not tell
us what the community does equal.
55. An Atlas for Obscenity. Exploring Community Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 157,
167 nn.41-45 (1974) [hereinafter 'Atlas"].
56. People v. Butler, 49 111.2d 435, 436, 275 N.E.2d 400, 401 (1971).
57. Jones v. City of Birmingham, 45 Ala. App. 86, 87, 224 So.2d 922, 923 (1969).
58. See Atlas at 169 n.56 (citing Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 116, 189 S.E.2d
324, 327 (1972), vacated, 413 U.S. 912).
59. Carter v. State, 388 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
60. See Atlas at 168 n.51 (citing State v. Gulf States Theatres, Inc., 264 La. 44, 47, 270
So.2d 547, 560 (1972), vacated, 287 So.2d 496).
61. Id. at 168 n.52 (citing State v. Little Art. Corp., 189 Neb. 681, 686, 204 N.W.2d 574,
578 (1973)).
62. See McGrew v. City of Jackson, 307 F. Supp. 754, 760 (S.D. Miss. 1969), vacated, 401
U.S. 987; Chernline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1966).
63. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
64. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
65. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
66. Id. at 33-34.
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A. Why Do Courts Care About "Protecting" the Community From
Obscenity?
The Supreme Court has been intent on protecting this nebulous en-
clave called the "community" from the perceived evils of obscenity and
pornography.67 Why? From our Puritan roots to today's naysayers,6 a
obscenity has been blamed for a myriad of social evils.69 The U.S. De-
partment of Justice undertook an exhaustive study of pornography and
concluded that such materials were harmful to society.7" To bolster its
support for a national anti-pornography campaign, the government
formed a specialized National Obscenity Enforcement Unit to target ob-
scenity prosecutions.7"
In a curious fellowship, the government and God appear to be on
the same side when it comes to obscenity. Not surprisingly, religious
organizations have consistently fueled the anti-obscenity fire. One article
in a religious journal authored by a federal prosecutor purports to de-
bunk ten popular myths about obscenity.72 It lists children and women
as particular targets of serial murderers and rapists7 3 who are purport-
edly driven to act out the scenes of violent pornography they view.74
Among obscenity's "silent victims" are said to be marriages and families
(damaged by "pornography-inflamed sexual abuse"),75 as well as com-
munities (damaged by street violence around pornographic outlets).76
Some say obscenity "promotes, dramatizes, glorifies, and many believe,
causes horrors" such as: rape, torture, incest, child molestation, mutila-
67. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. A distinction should be made between
pornography and obscenity. Pornography is a generic term for sexually explicit materials.
Obscenity is a legal term of art for illegal pornography, sometimes called hard-core pornogra-
phy. RICO Forfeiture and Obscenity: Prior Restraint or Subsequent Punishment 56 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1101 n.2 (1988). See also, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 12-
17, at 920-24 (2d ed. 1988).
68. During his 1988 campaign for the presidency, George Bush denounced the American
Civil Liberties Union for its position on pornography. U.S. Civil Liberties Group Defends Itself
From Bush Attack, The Reuter Library Report, Oct. 2, 1988 (LEXIS, Nexis library, News file).
69. In one of his final statements before his January, 1989 execution in Florida, serial killer
Ted Bundy blamed his exposure to hard-core pornography for fueling his fantasies and having
a "crystallizing effect" on his violent tendencies. Ted Bundy Shows Us The Crystallizing Effect
of Pornography, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, pt. 2, at 7, col. 1.
70. See generally, Final Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
(1986).
71. See United States Department of Justice Legal Activities, 1989-90, at 32.
72. See, e.g., H. Showers, Myths and Misconceptions of Pornography: What You Don't
Know Can Hurt You, 9 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y Q. 8 (Fall 1988).
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
19901
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tion and murder.7 7 Sexual immorality, it is decreed in the Bible, ranks
among the negative traits that "make a man 'unclean.' ,78
Clean or unclean, there are those who take strong exception to such
fire-and-brimstone views of pornography. Some professionals maintain
that obscenity may actually be helpful to certain segments of society. 9
One court, in holding the movie "Deep Throat" not obscene, observed
that there may be a socially "beneficial utility of pornography."8
However, the debate over whether obscenity is good or bad for soci-
ety is irrelevant8 when viewed in the context of the first amendment.
8 2
The issue is simply whether obscenity is constitutionally protected
speech. Rather than asking whether we should protect society from ob-
scenity, the question becomes: should we protect sexually explicit mater-
ials from the dictates of society?
B. Will Obscenity Remain Unprotected?
The Supreme Court has never solidly lined up against obscenity.
The Court in Roth v. United States8 3 was not unanimous in holding ob-
scenity outside the protective cloak of the first amendment. In fact, in all
its 1973 obscenity rulings84 the Court was sharply divided 5 on the issue.
Of course, the Court has changed considerably in composition since the
1973 panel86 that held against obscenity as protected speech.
77. H. Showers, Myths and Misconceptions of Pornography: What You Don't Know Can
Hurt You, 9 CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'Y Q. 9 (Fall 1988).
78. Id. at 10 (quoting Matthew 15:18-20a).
79. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 565 F.
Supp. 7, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting Meyer, B.F. Skinner on Behaving His Age, Washington
Post, Aug. 24, 1982, at BI). Behavioral psychologist B.F. Skinner, in a speech to the Ameri-
can Psychological Association, supported the view of theologian Paul Tillick that pornography
may be advantageously used to "extend sexuality into old age." Id.
80. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 565 F. Supp. at 9.
81. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 281 (1976). This raises admissibility issues in
obscenity prosecutions. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. FED. R. EVID. 402.
Therefore, defense testimony that exposure to sexually explicit materials is not harmful, as well
as prosecution evidence that obscenity causes "moral decay or criminal activity," are both
immaterial to a particular defendant or to the materials in issue and should be excluded. F.
SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 281 (1976).
82. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;..." U.S. CONST.
amend. I, § 1.
83. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
84. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
85. In each case, the vote was 5-4.
86. The Court in 1973 consisted of Justices Burger, Powell, Blackmun, Brennan, Douglas,
(Vol. 10
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Four of the current Justices have made it clear that they find the
Miller test unacceptable.87 Justices Brennan, Stevens and Marshall have
consistently pointed to problems in applying the Miller test. 8 Justice
Scalia, concurring in Pope v. Illinois, '9 dropped a strong hint that had he
been asked to reexamine the Miller test, he would have opted to do so.90
However, the Court has recently sent strong signals that it intends
to preserve Miller. In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 9' the Court
flatly rejected an invitation to overturn Miller. 92
Moreover, the mood of the public appears to have been gathering an
anti-pornography momentum. On September 29, 1989, House and Sen-
ate negotiators voted to ban federal funds for "obscene" art.93 When the
United States invaded Panama in December, 1989, American newspa-
pers trumpeted that "lewd pornographic photographs" were found in
General Manuel Noriega's bunker.94 Many states have current obscenity
laws in force,95 and prosecutors are constantly looking for new weapons
such as pandering statutes96 and RICO laws97 to use in the fight against
obscenity. Since the Miller test is central to that arsenal, it is doubtful
that the current Court will abandon it altogether. The question is
whether the Court will fine-tune the vague community standards prong
of Miller-and define the type of evidence required to prove those stan-
dards-to make Miller a viable test.
IV. COMMUNITY STANDARDS PRONG OF THE MILLER TEST
The Miller test requires that the standards of the community be
Marshall, White, Stewart and Rehnquist. Burger, Douglas and Stewart have been replaced by
Stevens, O'Connor and Scalia.
87. The four are Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia. Obscenity: 30 Years of
Confusion and Still Counting-Pope v. Illinois, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 379, 405 n. 250 (1987).
88. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
89. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
90. Id. at 502.
91. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
92. Id. at 924.
93. Obscenity Measure Approved, Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1989, at Al.
94. Pornography, Drugs Found in Noriega's Lair, Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 1989, at 10.
95. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
96. See People v. Freeman-No End Runs on the Obscenity Field or You Can't Catch Me
From Behind, 9 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 69 (1989).
97. See RICO Forfeiture and Obscenity- Prior Restraint or Subsequent Punishment, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1988).
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used to determine whether sexually explicit materials are obscene. 9
However, Miller did not define the size of the community. It indicated
that the community was smaller than the nation, but it did not say
whether the community could be smaller, for example, than the state.99
A. Various Interpretations of "Community"
In Miller, jurors were instructed that the community was the state
of California."° ° The Court held that the "[First Amendment does not
require] that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction
of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City."1 ° Curi-
ously, the Court mentioned both state and municipal standards in the
same breath. Was this an inadvertent mixed metaphor, or was the Court
implying that the community could be as small as a city? Could it be
even smaller? 0 2
But determining what "the entire community believes" may be im-
possible when the community is a large, diverse city such as Los Angeles.
An experienced pollster has observed that "attitudes regarding the depic-
tion of sexual matters vary markedly from one location in a city to an-
other." '3 He concludes that the lack of consensus within the city may
mean that there are no community standards. A further danger, he sug-
gests, is that of the "pseudocommunity," the neighborhood or portion of
the city where a juror may live and work. The homogeneous values of
the pseudocommunity may obscure for such a juror the actual variations
in standards that exist in the larger community. 10'
The city of Chicago was deemed the relevant community in United
States v. Various Articles of Merchandise, Seizure No. 170. 10' While the
Seventh Circuit did not find this error, on remand it suggested that the
district court should consider whether "a larger community, such as the
98. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
99. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 124 (1976).
100. Miller, 413 U.S. at 31.
101. Id. at 32.
102. In extremely large cities, such as Los Angeles or New York, a case could be made for a
quasi "community" that lies within a portion of the city limits. In United States v. Gottesman,
CR 88-295-KN (1989), the community was the city of Los Angeles. Federal District Judge
David Kenyon dismissed the RICO and obscenity charges because he could not determine
whether the films violated community standards in an area as diverse as Los Angeles. "The
great majority of people in this town would be incensed by this [material]. I just do not believe
that unless you have positive evidence of what the entire community believes in this area, that
any judge could say ... whether it's obscene or [just] pornographic," said the judge. Porno
Case Is Dismissed; L.A. Diversity Cited, L.A. Times, May 4, 1989, pt. I at 1, col. 4.
103. Bell, Determining Community Standards, 63 A.B.A. J. 1203, 1206 (Sept. 1977).
104. Id.
105. 750 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Chicago metropolitan area or the Northern District of Illinois, may be
more suitable."' °6
The jurisdictions have made various interpretations of their own.
Some state courts have defined the relevant community as the state.107
Others have specified local communities or municipalities as the
standard. 1
08
In United States v. Pryba "0 the district court instructed jurors to
apply the standards of "the adult community in the Alexandria Division
of the Eastern District of Virginia.""'  Some scholars believe that this
venire-based approach is the correct one and that "the size of the com-
munity is theoretically the area from which the jury is drawn.""' Some
courts have even required that the community be defined as that of the
venire. I "
The Supreme Court has tended to employ a more relaxed standard,
allowing jurors to use their own perceptions to define the community. In
Hamling v. United States '3 the Court held that jurors could rely upon
their personal experience and knowledge to assess the standards of the
community. No definition of community was given.' 14 Moreover, the
Court saw fit to explain that its "holding in Miller that California could
constitutionally proscribe obscenity in terms of a 'statewide' standard did
not mean that any such precise geographic area is required as a matter of
constitutional law.""' 5 While implying that the community would logi-
cally be that of the venire, the Court commented that it may, however, be
proper under certain circumstances to "admit evidence of standards ex-
isting in some place outside of this particular district."" ' 6 Unfortunately,
the Court offered no clues as to what those circumstances might be.
B. Evidentiary Problems When "Community" Is Undefined
Based on Hamling, courts have consistently, albeit mysteriously, al-
106. Id. at 600 n.4.
107. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. United Books, 389 Mass. 888, 453 N.E.2d 406 (1983);
Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So.2d 218 (1974); State v. Cimino, 33 Conn. Sup. 681, 366
A.2d 1168 (1976).
108. See. e.g., United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975); State v. Pierren, 583
P.2d 69 (Utah 1978); People v. Austin, 76 Mich. App. 455, 257 N.W.2d 120 (1977).
109. 678 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1988).
110. Id. at 1232.
111. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 126 (1976).
112. United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d 1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 1973).
113. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
114. Id. at 103-10.
115. Id, at 105.
116. Id. at 106.
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lowed juries to apply community standards without a specified geo-
graphic boundary. ! 17 But when the community remains undefined,
evidentiary problems may arise. How can the defense determine the ex-
tent and scope of evidence to put forward on community standards when
he or she does not know what "community" the jury has in mind? The
prosecution faces a similar dilemma. It has therefore been suggested that
upon the motion of either party, a trial judge should define "community"
so that both parties will have notice as to how wide or how narrow the
scope of their evidence should be."Ia
Another inherent danger in using an undefined "community" is that
the jury may see itself as a mirror of the community. With no extrinsic
standards to rely upon, jurors may have no choice but to rely on their
own. Therefore, current obscenity standards may "create a community
of the twelve seated in the [jury] box and permit their standards to
largely determine ex post facto whether material is obscene.""'
Some state obscenity statutes eliminate the guesswork by defining
"community" as the entire state. Congress could similarly define the
community for federal prosecutions, although it is unlikely to do so.12°
Moreover, a single standard for any large geographic area is likely to be
elusive. In expansive states such as California, New York and Texas, "a
statewide standard is little more ascertainable than a national stan-
dard."'' Even if it is ascertainable, it may not be logical. Why would
the standards of two bordering communities be different "just because a
state line intervenes?"
122
One scholar points out that "the Supreme Court had in mind a geo-
graphically limited community"'' 23 when it developed the community
standards test for obscenity. He suggests that in most cases, it is best to
define the community as a narrow area. However, if the area is too small
there may be a chilling effect upon distributors of sexually explicit mater-
ials because they may have to deal with too many different community
117. Lentz, Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials, 15 J.L. REFORM 45, 57 n.47 (1981).
118. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 131 (1976).
119. Ford v. State, 71 Ind. Dec. 580, 588, 394 N.E.2d 250, 258 (1979) (Garrard, P.J.,
dissenting).
120. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 127 (1976).
121. Id. at 125.
122. Id. at 125 n. 41. Consider, for example, Schauer's example of the two bordering com-
munities of Fairfield, Connecticut and Westchester, New York. Generally referred to as the
"Westchester-Fairfield" area, the two upscale communities are virtually indistinguishable
socio-economically. They share the same country clubs, polo grounds-and in all probability,
the same community standards on obscenity.
123. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 117 (1976).
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standards that make up their local distribution area. 124 The question
then becomes, how limited should the community be?
V. PROVING COMMUNITY STANDARDS
If a court can pass the threshold question of which "community" is
at issue, the next step is to determine what the term "standards" means
in the context of obscenity. Does it mean the lowest common denomina-
tor in the community, or does it mean sexually explicit materials that are
relatively mainstream?
Curiously, the Supreme Court in Miller seemed to have thrown a
curve ball when it commented that residents of one region of the country
need not "accept" sexually explicit materials which are found "tolerable"
elsewhere.' 25 That raised the question of whether tolerance or accept-
ance was the key to a community's "standards."
Through a series of decisions in the federal courts, 12 6 the answer
clearly became "acceptance." The district court in Pryba correctly ob-
served, "[c]ommunity acceptance is the touchstone of admissibility. It is
axiomatic that community tolerance or availability does not equate with
acceptability."' 127 That was the easy part; the difficulty for the court lay
in deciding which evidence to admit as probative of what the community
found acceptable or not acceptable. 1
28
Courts may also have to address an unusual but distinct possibility:
that a community may in fact have no standards or that such standards
may be unascertainable. Therefore, it would be impossible to determine
what is acceptable in the community. In State v. Kam, 121 jurors had
been instructed that they "must, as an average person, determine and
apply the contemporary community standards of the State of Hawaii." 30
The judge refused the appellant's requested instruction, which read: "If
you are unable to identify the statewide community standard, Defendant
is entitled to a finding in her favor."''
The appellate court in Kam found that the jurors may have con-
strued the court's instruction as "mandating them to decide that there
are contemporary community standards. The problem with such a man-
124. Id. at 125.
125. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
126. See Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1230 n.9.
127. Id. at 1230.
128. Id. at 1229-31.
129. 66 Haw. 528, 726 P.2d 263 (1986).
130. Id. at 530, 726 P.2d at 265.
131. Id., 726 P.2d at 265.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
date is that such standards may, or may not, exist."' 32 The court found
persuasive a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 33 case, which
stated: "A defendant is entitled to rulings or instructions that, if the trier
of fact cannot determine Commonwealth norms, the defendant is entitled
to a finding in his favor.. . . " '" Therefore, in order to convict a defend-
ant in an obscenity case, the trier of fact must find that a contemporary
community standard in fact exists before it can determine whether the
defendant violated it. 135
A. Expert Testimony
1. The Role of the Expert
An expert is one who possesses "scientific, technical or other spe-
cialized knowledge" '136 that is "beyond the ken of laymen."' 37 The role
of the expert is to impart such knowledge to the judge or jury, who will
use it to decide the factual issues of the case.
Unlike a lay witness, an expert may draw inferences from the facts
and may offer an opinion based upon the facts (or a hypothetical set of
facts). 3 ' The jury is free to accept or reject the expert's opinion.
An expert in an obscenity case may, for example, explain the rela-
tionship of various portions of a film or book to help the jury understand
the "work as a whole." If he has expertise in community standards, the
expert's testimony may help dissuade jurors from a tendency to equate
the standards of the community with their own.' 39 The expert may not,
however, offer a legal conclusion that the work is "obscene. ' ' 4
2. Admissibility Issues
The role of an expert in an obscenity case is the same as his or her
role in any other case: to assist the trier of fact in its search for the truth.
Generally, expert testimony must address a subject that is beyond the
understanding of the average layman. 4' However, the testimony may
132. Id., 726 P.2d at 265.
133. The Supreme Judicial Court is the highest state court in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
134. Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 799, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (1978).
135. Kam, 66 Haw. at 530, 726 P.2d at 265.
136. FED. R. EVID. 702.
137. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 13 (3d ed. 1984).
138. FED. R. EVID. 703.
139. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 286 (1976).
140. FED. R. EVID. 702 would preclude such testimony because the witness is not an "ex-
pert" in the law of obscenity. Therefore, his opinion would lack the necessary foundation.
141. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 13 (3d ed. 1984).
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still be admissible if it would be "helpful" to jurors who have a general
knowledge of the subject. 1
4 2
Secondly, the testimony must come from one who is qualified 143 as
an expert. The witness must have sufficient skill or expertise to assist the
trier of fact in making its determination."' Unlike personal injury cases
which logically call for medical testimony from physicians, there is no
obvious "obscenity expert" to call in an obscenity prosecution. Because
there is no defined area of "expertise," for example, in the area of com-
munity standards, 145 there is no clear demarcation as to who is or is not
an expert. However, Miller did suggest that such expertise is possible. 146
This latter question is precisely the one the court struggled with in
Pryba-and unfortunately, decided incorrectly. The exclusion of the de-
fense experts in Pryba had a profound effect upon the jurors, and ulti-
mately on their verdict.1
4 7
3. Application to Obscenity Cases
The utility of expert testimony in obscenity cases has been best de-
scribed as follows:
If the expert testimony is focused upon a particular aspect of
the test for obscenity, and if in that context it helps the jury to
understand that part of the test, or apply that part of the test,
or understand some aspect of the material at issue, then it be-
comes a very desirable addition to an obscenity case. 148
Clearly the most valuable use of expert testimony in obscenity cases
is to help jurors grasp what tends to be the most elusive part of the Miller
test: contemporary community standards. An expert can help define the
standards of the community 149 for the jurors and give them a frame of
reference upon which to decide whether the materials in question violate
those standards.
Particularly for jurors who have had little exposure to sexually ex-
plicit materials--or little exposure to outlying regions of an expansive
"community" such as a large state-expert testimony may be essential.
Without it some jurors may have difficulty determining what the rest of
142. Id.
143. FED. R. EVID. 702.
144. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 13 (3d ed. 1984).
145. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 286 (1976).
146. 413 U.S. at 31 n.12.
147. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
148. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 281 (1976).
149. Of course, such testimony is appropriate only in cases in which there are determinable
community standards. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
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the community, except for their immediate neighborhood or social circle,
finds acceptable.15° This is particularly true in jurisdictions which define
the relevant community as the entire state.
151
Arizona is one such state. In a bizarre reversal of its longstanding
position on obscenity, the Arizona Supreme Court recently decided that
expert testimony was not required on statewide community standards.'52
However, Justice Feldman's dissent points out that "[i]t defies common
sense to expect that a local jury will consistently intuit a statewide stan-
dard."1 3 He argued that expert testimony should be required when the
community encompasses the entire state.
154
Even when the community is more narrowly defined as that of the
venire, expert testimony on community standards may help prevent the
"natural inclination of many jurors ... to equate the community's stan-
dards with their own."'5 5 In fact, that is precisely what the jurors did in
Pryba. In an interview after the decision, six of the Pryba jurors stated
that the exclusion of expert testimony had left them uncertain as to com-
munity standards. 156 The jurors perceived themselves as more conserva-
tive than the "average" member of the community, so they felt
compelled to judge the materials "through the eyes of their parents, rela-
tives and neighbors."' 5 7 Some blamed the constraints and vagueness of
150. A juror's perception of community standards is likely to be affected by the location of
his home within the community. "For example, a person living in an outlying suburb might
very well have a profoundly different opinion on what is permitted in the metropolitan area
than would a person living in the inner city. This difference of opinion points out the need for
expert testimony on contemporary community standards." Is Expert Testimony Necessary to
Obscenity Litigation? The Arizona Supreme Court Answers-NO, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 821, 843
(1987) [hereinafter "Arizona"].
151. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 285-86 (1976). Professor Schauer further
notes that a juror's familiarity with state standards depends on:
the size and diversity of the state, and on the experiences of the particular juror.
Thus, expert testimony as to the statewide standards may be of considerable assist-
ance. Furthermore, community standards as to sexual materials may not necessarily
be something that jurors have noticed or thought about, and it is conceivable that a
juror's impressions about contemporary community standards can be modified by the
appropriate use of expert testimony.
Id. at 286.
152. See Arizona at 821.
153. Three consolidated cases of State v. Superior Court, State v. Shih Ching Lin, and State
v. Coulter (Ariz. S. Ct. July 2, 1986) (Feldman, J., dissenting), referred to collectively as Supe-
rior Court, slip op. at 19.
154. Id.
155. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 286 (1976).
156. A Jury Wrestles at 99.
157. Id. As one satirist noted, "the genius of the local jury is that it does not apply the local
community standard as reflected in the actual behavior of the people. Rather, the local jury
applies the expected or anticipated moral standard. This anticipated moral standard is that
which each member of the jury thinks other members of the jury expect him to possess" (em-
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the Miller test for what they later felt had resulted in an unfair outcome
to the Prybas.
158
4. How Courts Have Reacted to Obscenity Experts
Courts are split as to whether expert testimony is appropriate in
obscenity cases. Modem courts tend to allow expert testimony.'59 How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 11 indicated
that the field of obscenity did not lend itself to the traditional use of
expert testimony.16' The Court stated:
[Expert] testimony is usually admitted for the purpose of ex-
plaining to lay jurors what they otherwise could not understand
[citation omitted]. No such assistance is needed by jurors in
obscenity cases; indeed the 'expert witness' practices employed
in these cases have often made a mockery out of the otherwise
sound concept of expert testimony.1
62
It is important to note, however, that the Court based this reasoning
on its belief that the materials in question are themselves the "best evi-
dence of what they represent."' 163 Even if the books or films are the best
evidence of whether they are pornographic or obscene, they are not the
best evidence of whether such materials are or are not acceptable in the
community. Evidence of community standards should come from an ex-
pert who has conducted a reliable and relevant study of the community
and its attitudes toward sexually explicit materials.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution is not required to pro-
vide expert testimony in federal obscenity cases.' 6 Likewise, states gen-
erally do not require expert testimony in state obscenity prosecutions. 1
65
However, the defendant does have a right to present expert testimony, 1
66
phasis in original). Brigman, The Controversial Role of The Expert In Obscenity Litigation, 7
CAP. U.L. REV. 519, 542 (1978) (quoting The Obscenity Report, 110-11 (1970)).
158. A Jury Wrestles at 99. This is a fascinating article that examines the dynamics of the
jury's deliberations-and its dilemmas in dealing with the evidence and the Miller test-in the
Pryba case. One juror commented in an interview after the verdict: "Why [was the Govern-
ment] going after the Prybas? ... These people sell dildos to adults. They were going to take
someone's house away for that?" (emphasis in original). After the vote the juror asked herself,
"Have we trampled all over the [f]irst [a]mendment?" Id.
159. See generally, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
160. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
161. Id. at 56 n.6.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 56.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
166. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
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as long as it is relevant and not misleading to the jury. 16 7 The Supreme
Court recognized that one charged with an obscenity violation has a
right to "enlighten" the trier of fact as to community standards "through
qualified experts."' 6  The Court further recognized that community
standards "can as a matter of fact hardly be established except through
experts. Therefore, to exclude such expert testimony is in effect to ex-
clude as irrelevant evidence that goes to the very essence of the defense
and therefore to the constitutional safeguards of due process."
1 69
5. Who Is Qualified as an "Obscenity" Expert?
The study of pornography and obscenity is not exclusive to any one
field or profession. The effect of sexually explicit materials upon individ-
uals or groups in society has been studied by professionals in any number
of fields, including medicine, psychology and sociology. Therefore, there
is no unanimity on which type of expert would be the most qualified to
testify in an obscenity case.
The courts have taken note of this ambiguity but have not reacted to
it in any uniform manner. Some courts have rejected the testimony of
sex therapists1 7' and homosexuals 7 as experts on community standards;
other courts have allowed sociologists, 72 art professors, 173 psychia-
trists, 1 74 and vice squad police officers 175 to offer such testimony.
In most cases, this confusion as to who is a proper obscenity expert
has worked to the advantage of the prosecution. The prosecution rarely
presents expert testimony on community standards because it is not re-
quired to do SO. 1 7 6 More often the defense will offer an expert, and the
prosecution will challenge the witness' credentials to testify as an expert
on community standards. Because it has never been established who is a
proper obscenity expert, judges tend to side with the prosecution and
exclude defense expert witnesses. This effectively "emasculates the de-
fense,"' 17 7 which is thus barred from presenting opinion testimony as well
167. See FED. R. EVID. 403, 702.
168. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (cited
with approval in Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973)).
169. Id.
170. See Albright v. State, 501 N.E.2d 488 (Ind. App. 4 Dist. 1986); Sedelbauer v. State,
455 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. App. 3 Dist. 1983).
171. Id.
172. See State v. Anderson, 85 N.C. App. 104, 354 S.E.2d 264 (1987).
173. See Commonwealth v. United Books, 389 Mass. 888, 453 N.E.2d 406 (1983).
174. See State v. Hull, 86 Wash. 2d 527, 546 P.2d 912 (1976).
175. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
176. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
177. Appellants' Opening Brief at 32, Pryba.
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as introducing any studies or surveys its expert may have conducted for
the particular case.
This is precisely what happened in Pryba. The Prybas' expert was a
sociologist with a background in statistical methodology, who had con-
ducted an attitudinal survey in the community. 17 The trial judge ex-
cluded him as an expert in community standards because he had never
lived in the community and had spent only eight days there conducting
his survey. 179 Some scholars feel that "if the issue is contemporary com-
munity standards, then a local witness is a necessity in order that the
testimony relate particularly to the community whose standards are at
issue."' 80 But this would seem unduly harsh on the defendant, who
would be burdened with having to seek out a local expert for each indi-
vidual case. How can it fairly be assumed that every jurisdiction, no
matter how small, isolated or unsophisticated, will have within its
bounds someone qualified to testify as an expert on the standards of that
community?
Even when the expert is drawn from the community, there is still no
guarantee the court will allow him or her to testify. In Albright v.
State, 181 the court prohibited testimony from a certified sex therapist
who lived and practiced in the community. 18 2 The expert had examined
200 patients in three years, 60 of whom had sexual dysfunctions. This
experience was held irrelevant as to the general community's attitude to-
ward sexually explicit material.' 83
If such specialized expertise precludes one from being an expert on
the standards of the community at large, perhaps courts would accept an
expert with more generalized contacts in the community. One scholar
suggests that proper experts may include: statisticians, public opinion
analysts, police officers, journalists, ministers, or "others who are espe-
cially knowledgeable and experienced as to community views and be-
liefs."' 84 However, it may be argued that police officers tend to have
contact with a narrow segment of society-those who run afoul of the
law-and that ministers deal with an equally insular, if opposite, group
of the populace. Neither the criminal element nor religious devotees can
be said to represent the views of the general public on sexually explicit
materials.
178. United States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1232.
179. Id.
180. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 289-90 (1976).
181. 501 N.E.2d 488 (Ind. App. 1986).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 493.
184. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 289 (1976).
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
Another writer mentions the problems of clergymen as experts" 5
and offers the following laundry list of other potential experts18 6 in ob-
scenity cases: sociologists, social workers, students of American culture,
distributors of similar (sexually explicit) materials, librarians, those
knowledgeable in the arts-such as critics, professors, 8 7 or publishers-
as well as movie craftsmen, producers and film reviewers. Among the
more likely experts may be psychiatrists and psychologists.'
Whatever field the witness comes from, it has been observed that
"the only expert likely to aid the trier of fact is the expert who has gath-
ered significant data through opinion-attitude survey methods."18 9 That,
of course, would require a witness qualified to conduct a survey, such as
a sociologist or a statistician. Curiously, that was exactly the back-
ground of the Prybas' expert, who did in fact conduct such a survey.
However, this gives a court one more element to use in excluding a de-
fense expert: if he passes the threshold issue of expertise in community
standards, the witness may still be excluded if the results of his survey
are considered unreliable or more prejudicial than probative.' 90 This was
the "hook" the district court used in Pryba to get itself "off the hook" for
excluding the defense's experts.
B. Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as Evidence of Community
Standards
1. Polls as Foundation for Expert Testimony
If an expert is allowed to testify, he may be required to state the
basis on which he formed his opinion.' 9 The most persuasive basis for
an opinion as to community standards is likely to come from a public
opinion poll or survey that the expert conducted within the relevant com-
munity. One court, in allowing survey evidence in an obscenity case,
observed:
Expert testimony based on a public opinion poll is uniquely
suited to a determination of community standards. Perhaps no
other form of evidence is more helpful or concise: 'A properly
185. Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HASTINGS L. J. 161, 176 n.89
(1966).
186. Id. at 176.
187. See supra note 173 (art professor accepted as obscenity expert).
188. Note, The Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 113,
116 (1965).
189. Shugrue, An Atlas For Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 157, 170 (1974).
190. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
191. FED. R. EvID. 705.
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conducted public opinion survey itself adequately ensures a
good measure of trustworthiness, and its admission may be nec-
essary in the sense that no other evidence would be as good as
the survey evidence or perhaps even obtainable as a practical
matter.'1 92
In fact, some authorities feel that a properly conducted opinion poll
affords "[t]he only basis upon which one could arguably claim expertise
in the matter of community standards."'' 93 Therefore, expert testimony
and survey results will often form a crucial link for an obscenity defense.
As the Prybas learned, the exclusion of such evidence may effectively
cripple the defense.
Even the court which ruled against the Prybas on this issue ac-
knowledged that a properly conducted public opinion survey may be ad-
missible to prove community standards. 94  The message from the
Supreme Court is that expert statistical or sampling testimony about
what a sample of the community actually believes "may" be admissible
in obscenity cases.195
The choice of the word "may" creates an inherent stumbling block:
admissibility often turns on whether the poll does in fact reflect the stan-
dards of the community. This offers fertile ground for an extenuated
evidentiary battle. The prosecution, as it did in Pryba, is likely to argue
that the poll-or the person who conducted it-is somehow flawed,
thereby rendering the poll incompetent evidence which must be ex-
cluded. The burden may shift to the defense to show that the poll is an
accurate reflection of the community's attitude toward obscenity.
However, as the Prybas' attorneys argued, the defense should not
have to shoulder this burden.' 96 Rather, the issue should go to the
weight of the survey rather than to its admissibility. 197 Some state courts
192. Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (Ind. App. 2 Dist. 1985) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 801, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (1978)).
193. Stern, Toward a Rationale for the Use of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 20
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 527, 553 (1969).
194. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1229.
195. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973); see also
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
196. Appellants' Opening Brief at 36, Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 1225 (Nos. 88-5001 (L), 88-5002,
88-5003, 88-5004) (1988).
197. Miller, Facts, Expert Facts, and Statistics. Descriptive and Experimental Research
Methods in Litigation: 11, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 467, 486 (1988). In analogizing survey evi-
dence in obscenity cases to similar issues in trademark cases, Miller suggests that "the cases
generally agree that defects in survey methodology go to the weight of the survey rather than
its admissibility." Id.
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have adopted the same view. 198
2. Evidentiary Standards for Admissibility: Relevance and Reliability
Present standards for admissibility require an extremely fact-specific
inquiry as to precisely how a poll in an obscenity case was conducted. As
a threshold issue, the survey must be relevant and reliable evidence.' 99
Therefore, questions asked in such a survey must be carefully framed to
meet this criteria . 2°  The court in Pryba offered a two-prong test 20 1 to
determine whether the survey questions were relevant as to community
standards: (1) the questions must focus on the allegedly obscene materi-
als in the case, or materials that are "clearly akin ' 2 ° 2 to them; and (2) the
questions must address whether the interviewee believes that the materi-
als "depict nudity and sex in an acceptable manner."203
The district court in Pryba found the specific questions2° 4 posed by
the expert flawed because it felt they focused on whether adults "should"
be able to obtain such sexually explicit materials, rather than whether the
community finds such materials "acceptable. '20 5 It found that the ques-
tions were too broad because they addressed attitudes about "nudity and
sex" in general, rather than inquiring about whether the depictions in the
materials at issue were actually accepted in the community. 20 6 On that
basis, the court found the questions irrelevant and ruled the survey inad-
missible on the grounds that it was not probative of community
standards.20 7
Curiously, the court in Pryba seemed to require an almost impossi-
ble standard of specificity for such a poll to meet. Having viewed the
films at issue, the court noted that "descriptive language fails to convey
the impact of the visual image. ", 208 For example, the court noted that the
term "bondage" as used in the poll did not adequately describe some of
the violent acts in the films.209 Therefore, it reasoned that while the vis-
198. See Carlock v. State, 609 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Saliba v. State, 475
N.E.2d 1181, 1188, transfer denied, 484 N.E.2d 1295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
199. See FED. R. EvID. 402.
200. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
201. Id. at 1229.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text for specific questions that were posed in
the Pryba poll.
205. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
206. Id. at 1229 (citing Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, 672 (1980)).
207. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1229.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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ual image itself may be patently offensive, a written or verbal description
may not be.2 ' If that is so, how can any question in an obscenity poll
meet such an admissibility standard? The court's bizarre implication
seems to be that the pollster must cart around with him a video cassette
recorder and a box full of films in order to pose questions to
interviewees. 2 1
Due to its perceived inadequacy of the written word in capturing the
"flavor" of the visual image, the court in Pryba feared that the survey
results would be unfairly prejudicial to the jury.2 12 Therefore, the court
held that the probative value of the survey did not outweigh its potential
for prejudicial impact.2 3 In a strongly worded-and rather revealing-
portion of the opinion, the court declared that Dr. Scott's ethnography
2 ,4
study was "nothing more than a one-man, eight-day, unscientific poll of
purveyors and purchasers of smut.
2 15
3. Proper Methodology for Conducting a Survey on Community
Standards
The Pryba court's difficulty with Dr. Scott's study calls into question
how a proper opinion poll should be conducted in an obscenity case.
Based upon the court's reaction in Pryba, the following issues appear to
be paramount: (1) what type of questions should be asked; (2) who
should be polled; (3) where should the poll be conducted, and (4) how
extensive or of what duration must the survey be?
Some of these questions have been addressed in piecemeal fashion by
the courts, but considered as a whole they are yet to be resolved. To-
gether these questions encompass the underlying issue: what is the
proper method of conducting a survey on community standards? The
court in Pryba outright rejected Dr. Scott's "ethnography" method and
held it was not competent evidence.2 6
Curiously, other courts have accepted ethnography evidence in ob-
scenity cases. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in fact, found it
210. Id. at 1227 n.3.
211. As the Prybas' attorneys pointed out, such a requirement could open up the pollster to
criminal liability if the visual materials he displayed were later deemed to be legally obscene.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 34, Pryba; Appellants' Reply Brief at 13, Pryba.
212. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1231.
213. Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 403).
214. Ethnography is a branch of anthropology that deals with cultural differences. Dr.
Scott testified that ethnography "looks at what is going on in the community." State v. Ander-
son, 85 N.C. App. 104, 107, 354 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1987). See also supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text.
215. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1234.
216. Id. at 1232.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
reversible error when a public opinion poll and expert testimony based
on an ethnographical study were excluded in an obscenity case.2 17 The
defense expert in that case was none other than Dr. Scott-the witness
whom the Pryba court excluded. The North Carolina court found Dr.
Scott and his ethnography study perfectly acceptable evidence of com-
munity standards, stating:
[I]f Dr. Scott, based on his specialized knowledge of contempo-
rary community standards, formed an opinion about whether
the challenged materials would be patently offensive to the av-
erage person in the community, then we can see no reason,
based on a relevancy objection, to prevent the jury from having
the benefit of that opinion testimony.218
Arriving at the exact opposite conclusion from the district court in
Pryba, the North Carolina court ruled that the probative value of Dr.
Scott's testimony "outweighs any potential for prejudice, confusion or
undue delay."21 9  Accordingly, it ordered a new trial for the
defendant.22°
Similarly, an Illinois court found reversible error when a public
opinion poll on community standards was excluded in an obscenity
case.22 ' The court viewed the survey results as "strong evidence
' 222 of
community standards, stating:
In fact, survey evidence may be the only way to prove degrees
of acceptability of a product or material, as distinct from its
availability. The State does not have the burden of introducing
any evidence as to what the ... community standard is. But
that cannot justify a court in denying the defendant the right to
introduce the best evidence he can gather on this issue. Essen-
tially the result of refusing the proffered evidence left the jurors
with no way of knowing what the . .. [community] standard
might be.223
Unfortunately, few other courts have been so enlightened. The
Georgia Court of Appeals rejected a public opinion poll in an obscenity
case 224 largely on the same grounds that the district court did in Pryba:
217. State v. Anderson, 85 N.C. App. 104, 354 S.E.2d 264 (1987).
218. Id. at 109, 354 S.E.2d at 269.
219. Id., 354 S.E.2d at 269.
220. Id., 354 S.E.2d at 269.
221. People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196, 410 N.E.2d 476 (1980).
222. Id. at 199, 410 N.E.2d at 479.
223. Id. at 199, 410 N.E.2d at 479 (citations omitted).
224. Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 235, 264 S.E.2d 669, 672 (1980) cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980).
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the questions were not specific enough to be probative of community
standards. Similarly, other courts22 5 have excluded surveys which do not
address community acceptance of conduct specifically as depicted in the
materials at issue.
Based on these cases-and on the Pryba ruling-the prevailing atti-
tude of the courts toward survey evidence in obscenity cases seems to be
"when in doubt, throw it out." Courts have been more comfortable ex-
cluding such evidence than admitting it. Judges have given few insights
as to what would make a poll admissible, other than basic standards of
relevancy and reliability. However, if a survey passes muster under the
rules of evidence, a party must consider whether commissioning that sur-
vey is worth the inherent risks.
4. Strategic Considerations
There may be a calculated risk in basing a large part of a case on a
public opinion survey, particularly for prosecutors. The prosecution is
not required to provide evidence of community standards.226 However,
"[i]f the government does choose to introduce evidence of community
standards, it should be prepared to do its homework,"22 chided the Sev-
enth Circuit in branding a prosecution survey as "canned" and "barely
relevant" to the obscenity inquiry.22
Moreover, if the prosecutor does commission a survey, the results
could backfire on him. If the responses indicate that residents of the
community accept this type of material, the survey may become exculpa-
tory evidence which must be disclosed to the defense.2 29
The risks are considerably less for the defense. If the poll results are
favorable, this may become powerful evidence in front of a jury. One
commentator considers survey evidence to be the best evidence the de-
fense can offer in an obscenity case.23 ° In addition, "[s]uch empirical
data will tend to reduce the otherwise inevitable battle of the experts."23'
However, since courts have provided no clear guidelines as to how a
225. See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 374 N.E.2d 1216 (1978); People v.
Thomas, 37 Ill. App. 3d 320, 346 N.E.2d 190 (1976).
226. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 194 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
227. United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise, Seizure No. 170, 750 F.2d 596, 599-
600 (7th Cir. 1984).
228. Id. at 599.
229. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 135 (1976).
230. Miller, Facts, Expert Facts, and Statistics: Descriptive and Experimental Research
Methods in Litigation: II, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 467, 485 (1988).
231. Id. at 485-86.
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proper survey in an obscenity case should be conducted, a distinct possi-
bility exists that such a survey may be ruled inadmissible. Thus the de-
fense risks an investment of both time and money in a piece of evidence
that may be inadmissible at trial. Further, the defense may find itself
having to regroup and formulate a new strategy at the eleventh hour if its
key piece of evidence-and its expert-are excluded by the trial court.
Such was the disadvantaged situation the Prybas found themselves
trapped in by the district court.
C. Comparison Evidence
Another way that courts reject survey evidence in obscenity cases is
to hold that the materials used in the survey are not "comparable" to the
materials in question. Such was the approach of the district court in
Pryba. 232 This poses a curious dilemma for the defense and its pollster:
How "comparable" must the survey be to the "real thing?" If they are
not comparable, the poll's results may be inadmissible; if they are too
comparable, the pollster may open himself up to prosecution for distrib-
uting what may be ruled legally obscene material.233
A safer use of comparison evidence may be by inference: wide-
spread availability of materials similar to those in question may be evi-
dence of what is acceptable in the community.23 The theory is that if
the community allows similar materials to circulate within its bounds,
then the materials at issue cannot be obscene because the community
impliedly accepts them.
However, courts have held that "mere availability" standing alone is
not enough.235 The Supreme Court observed that availability of similar
materials does not necessarily equate with community acceptance. 236
For availability to be probative of community standards, there must also
be evidence that the material has a "reasonable degree of acceptance" in
the community.237 Otherwise, availability of similar materials means
"nothing more than that other persons are engaged in similar activi-
232. 678 F. Supp. at 1233.
233. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
234. See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 709
F.2d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1983). For an in-depth analysis of the impact of Schedule 2102 and
other cases on this proposition, see also In Determining Whether Materials Are Obscene, The
Trier of Fact May Rely Upon the Widespread Availability of Comparable Materials to Indicate
That the Materials Are Accepted by the Community and Hence Not Obscene Under the Miller
Test, 52 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1131 (1983).
235. United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1971).
236. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126 (1974).
237. Manarite, 448 F.2d at 593. See also Lentz, Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials,
15 J. L. REFORM 45, 67-69 (1981).
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ties."23 From an evidentiary stance, mere availability alone is irrelevant
and thus inadmissible.239
Basic foundational elements for comparison evidence to meet rele-
vancy standards require that the comparison material be: (1) similar"4
to the material in question; and (2) acceptable to the community. 241  The
Second Circuit in United States v. Manarite 24 2 suggested that proof of
community acceptance "would normally be supplied by expert wit-
nesses." 243 Apparently that court did not envision the precarious situa-
tion that defendants such as the Prybas would be placed in nearly 20
years later, with courts not hesitating to exclude expert testimony on
community standards.
Some defendants have attempted to introduce sales figures of similar
materials as a means to show both availability and acceptance. 2 " In
Flynt v. State, 245 a widely publicized case in the 1970s, publisher Larry
Flynt was prohibited from presenting sales records of Hustler magazine,
as well as comparison materials which had sold 1.3 million copies in the
county during the six-month period which encompassed his alleged ob-
scenity violations. 246 The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that the evi-
dence had been properly excluded because the comparison exhibits were
not the best evidence and because they demonstrated availability rather
than community acceptance.247
Over the years, courts have varied widely in the admission and ex-
clusion of comparison evidence in obscenity cases.248 "Some have admit-
ted [comparison evidence]; some have excluded it; some have reversed
lower courts for refusing to admit it; some have suggested it is never
238. Manarite, 448 F.2d at 593.
239. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
240. The content (sexual acts) and the explicitness of their presentation must be similar to
the materials that are the subject matter of the obscenity case. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF
OBSCENITY 134 (1976).
241. Lentz, Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials, 15 J. L. REFORM 63-64 (citing United
States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
242. 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1971).
243. Manarite, 448 F.2d at 593.
244. The court in Pryba took defense expert Dr. Scott to task for offering "no quantitative
analysis for much of his male sophisticate material, such as sale or distribution figures, which
might have been probative of community acceptance." Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1234 (emphasis
in original). However, since the court found many of the materials Dr. Scott used in his survey
not comparable to the materials in question, one must wonder whether the court was merely
dangling a carrot in front of the defense regarding sales figures. Sales figures are admissible
only for comparable materials. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 133-34 (1976).
245. 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669 (1980).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Lentz, Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials, 15 J. L. REFORM 45, 50 (1981).
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admissible. Moreover, the courts' reasoning has been as disparate as
their conclusions."24 9 In ruling on the Flynt case, the Georgia Court of
Appeals aptly observed that comparison evidence is "one of the most
often attempted and rarely successful methods of presenting evidence of
contemporary community standards."25
This maxim is underscored by the Supreme Court's ruling in Ham-
ling v. United States, 251 which held that it was permissible to exclude
comparison evidence because a defendant was free to offer expert testi-
mony on community standards. However, comparison evidence may in
fact be "essential to an adequate defense against obscenity charges." '252
This is particularly crucial to cases such as Pryba, in which expert testi-
mony and comparison evidence were excluded. When a court permits no
expert testimony, no opinion poll, and no comparison evidence, how is a
jury of laymen to determine what the community does or does not find
acceptable?
VI. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO PROVE COMMUNITY STANDARDS
When courts handcuff defendants in obscenity cases from presenting
expert testimony or comparison evidence, there may be other ways the
trier of fact can draw inferences about community standards. These al-
ternative methods tend to be less objectionable, but they are usually less
effective. They simply lack the communicative effect that live expert tes-
timony can have before a jury.
One scholar suggested that relatively "safe" alternative methods in a
federal prosecution under local standards include: state statutes, legisla-
tive history and municipal ordinances.2"3 The theory is that if the rele-
vant local community does not make a certain type of activity a crime,
then that activity is acceptable and does not violate the community's
standards. 2 4 Legislative history may be used to explain the relationship
between the statute and the community's standards.2 5 Municipal ordi-
nances may likewise be probative of the community's standards.25 6 Even
if there are local statutes, evidence of a policy of nonenforcement may be
249. Id. at 50-51.
250. Flynt, 264 S.E.2d at 681.
251. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
252. Lentz, Comparison Evidence in Obscenity Trials, 15 J. L. REFORM, 45, 75 (1981).
253. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 134 (1976).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. See also United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
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evidence of community standards.257
The fallback position of the courts has routinely been that it is per-
missible to exclude expert testimony and comparison evidence because
the allegedly obscene materials themselves are the best evidence of what
is acceptable in the community.25 Courts in the 1980s upheld this posi-
tion, ruling that whether materials are obscene can be determined by
viewing them, so excluding expert testimony on community standards
does not violate due process. 25 9 Therefore, the prevailing view seems to
be that when the films or books themselves are admitted in evidence,
there is no need for extrinsic evidence of community standards.
This, however, creates a dangerous standard. Showing films or
magazines in a vacuum gives a jury no point of reference, no way to
determine whether the materials in question exceed the bounds of what is
acceptable to the community. Research has indicated that in some com-
munities there is no consistency between one's personal standards and his
or her perception of community standards.2 " In locales where sexual
candor is limited, there is likely to be an ambiguity in articulation of
community standards.26' Therefore, when evidence of community stan-
dards is not presented, there is a marked possibility of jury bias in ob-
scenity cases.
262
VII. Do COURT TRIALS AND JURY TRIALS REQUIRE
DIFFERENT EVIDENCE?
The court in Pryba excluded the defense's expert and opinion poll
because of fears it "would have been unfairly prejudicial to the United
States, would have confused the issues and would have misled the
jury. '2 63 Clearly the emphasis was on the jury's perceived inability to
properly assess and weigh such evidence. This raises an issue not ad-
dressed in Pryba nor in other cases: would the ruling have been different
had this been a court trial instead of a jury trial? Are judges innately
better equipped to assess community standards than are jurors?
The difficulties that jurors typically have in obscenity cases are well-
documented. The Supreme Court moved from national standards to
community standards because it recognized that jurors cannot be ex-
257. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 134 (1976).
258. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
259. See Sedelbauer v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. App. 1983).
260. Herrman and Bordner, Attitudes Toward Pornography in a Southern Community, 21
CRIMINOLOGY 349, Aug., 1983.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1231.
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pected to know what the national standard of obscenity is.264 Some
would take that one step further, arguing that a jury is no more able to
determine a community standard than a national standard.265
Expert testimony has been suggested as the best way to help a jury
determine community standards, particularly when the relevant commu-
nity is the entire state.266 However, others maintain that unless the court
defines the relevant community for the jury, expert testimony is of no
help.
267
Judges face similar problems when presiding at court trials on ob-
scenity cases. In the recent federal obscenity prosecution of United
States v. Gottesman, 268 United States District Court Judge David V.
Kenyon dismissed the obscenity counts because he could not determine
that the materials violated community standards in a city as large and
diverse as Los Angeles. 69 Justice Stevens had anticipated this problem
more than a decade ago in Smith v. United States, 270 when he wrote, in
dissent: "For surely, the standard for a metropolitan area is just as 'hy-
pothetical and unascertainable' as any national standard. For a juror, it
would be almost as hard to determine the community standard for any
large urban area as it would be to determine a national standard.
'' 27'
Expert testimony was not presented in Gottesman, so one can only
speculate as to whether Judge Kenyon would have found such evidence
dispositive as to the community standards of Los Angeles. However, if a
federal district judge has difficulty ascertaining community standards
without the help of an expert, it appears axiomatic that a jury would
necessarily require such evidence.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
Pryba, like cases from many other jurisdictions, tells us what evi-
dence is not admissible in obscenity cases. The problem, however, is the
converse: no court has ruled definitively on what evidence must be
presented-and in what form it must be presented-to prove community
standards. With such scant guidance from the courts, both the prosecu-
264. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).
265. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. Is Expert Testimony Necessary to Obscenity Litigation? The Arizona Supreme Court
Answers-NO! 19 ARIz. ST. L.J. 821, 841 n.143 (1987).
267. Obscenity: 30 Years of Confusion and Still Counting-Pope v. Illinois, 21 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 379, 391 n.ll5 (1987).
268. L.A. Times, May 4, 1989, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4 (C.D.C. May 3, 1989).
269. Id.
270. 431 U.S. 291, 314 (1976).
271. Id. at 314 n.10.
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tion and the defense are left in the dark. Both parties can only guess at
what evidence should be presented. Therefore, if the Miller community
standards test is to be viable, courts must provide evidentiary guidelines
for litigants.
First, courts should define the relevant community on the motion of
any party before trial so litigants will know the scope of the evidence they
must produce. Before the jury begins deliberations, the court should in-
struct that it is conceivable a community may have no standards on ob-
scenity (in which case the defendant must be acquitted).
Presently the rule is that the prosecution is not required to present
evidence on community standards, but the defense can offer such evi-
dence. Rather, the rule should be that the prosecution must prove com-
munity standards or the defense is entitled to a dismissal. The existence
of community standards should be treated as an inherent element of an
obscenity violation. Therefore, the government or state should be re-
quired to prove every element of its case, as is required in any criminal
prosecution.272
Further, courts should provide clear-cut rulings on what type of evi-
dence is admissible to prove community standards. If that evidence is to
include an expert or an opinion poll, courts should indicate what qualifi-
cations an "expert" on community standards must possess and what
questions will be deemed relevant. If the survey is to include comparable
materials, courts should explain how "comparable" they must be. Cer-
tainly what appears to be the Pryba mandate-that the materials them-
selves must be shown because the written word does not convey the
impact of graphic sexual works-is unwieldy. Someone conducting an
opinion poll cannot be expected to cart around a box full of allegedly
obscene videos, a VCR and a television just because a member of the
community is likely to "know [obscenity] when he sees it."
'273
IX. CONCLUSION
In rejecting a national standard for obscenity, the Court in Miller
explained that applying such a standard would be "an exercise in futil-
272. "[T]he prosecution has the burden of proving each of the various elements of the of-
fense . . . it must, to secure a conviction, convince the trier of fact of the existence of each
element beyond a reasonable doubt." R. LAFAVE AND A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW,
§ 1.8(b) at 49 (2d ed. 1986) (citing C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 341 (3d ed. 1984). See also
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged").
273. This was Justice Stewart's often-quoted and amusing comment in his concurrence in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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ity" because the nation was "too big and too diverse." '2 74 Therefore, it
would be impossible for jurors to formulate and apply a uniform stan-
dard for obscenity to such an unwieldy and non-homogeneous geo-
graphic unit as the nation.
275
That pronouncement came in 1973. The same reasoning applies to-
day to our megalopolises, which have burgeoned in population in the
past two decades and have been transformed in character. Just as jurors
could not find a national standard for obscenity in 1973, neither can they
be expected to find a uniform standard in cities as sprawling and diverse
as the Los Angeles or New York of the 1990s. Logically, if this is an
impossible task to apply to today's major cities, it is likewise impossible
to determine a "community standard" for a larger and more diverse re-
gion, such as a state.
The only reliable way for the trier of fact to accurately determine
community standards is for courts to require expert testimony on that
issue. The burden should properly rest with the prosecution to establish
community standards through expert testimony. The defense must be
allowed to present its own expert testimony as well. The Supreme Court
has recognized:
[T]he right of one charged with obscenity-a right implicit in
the very nature of the legal concept of obscenity-to enlighten
the judgment of the tribunal, be it the jury or ... the judge,
regarding the prevailing literary and moral community stan-
dards and to do so through qualified experts.... [C]ommunity
standards . . . can as a matter of fact hardly be established ex-
cept through experts. Therefore, to exclude such expert testi-
mony is in effect to exclude as irrelevant evidence that goes to
the very essence of the defense and therefore to the constitu-
tional safeguards of due process.
276
Another right-the right to appellate review-is also burdened
when expert testimony is excluded. Without expert testimony, the trial
record does not disclose what standards the jury applied in deciding an
obscenity case. Therefore, decisions in such cases are "effectively unre-
viewable by an appellate court. '2 7 7 The Fifth Circuit expressed its frus-
tration over this dilemma: "We cannot take judicial notice, without even
274. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
275. Id.
276. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (cited with
approval in Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973)).
277. Brigman, The Controversial Role of the Expert in Obscenity Litigation, 7 CAP. U.L.
REV. 519, 526 (1978).
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a scintilla of evidence, of what constitutes the community standard of
decency at this or any other time .... At best it would be a matter of
pure chance as to whether we as a Court, or as individuals left to our
own devices and without the aid of evidence, could determine the correct
standard." '278
That is precisely the situation the jurors in Pryba were left with:
pure chance that they would reach the correct standard without expert
testimony. Unfortunately for the defendants-and for the first amend-
ment-the roll of the dice went to the prosecution.
Darlene Sordillo
278. Id. at 529-30 (quoting United States v. Groner, 475 F.2d 550, 557-58 (1972) vacated,
414 U.S. 969 (1973), reversed, 494 F.2d 499 (1974)). In another obscenity prosecution, Federal
District Court Judge David V. Kenyon alluded to the difficulty in determining community
standards when there has been no expert testimony. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying
text. After Judge Kenyon dismissed the obscenity case, the Los Angeles Times observed:
"Kenyon earlier in the trial expressed doubts about his ability to judge community standards
without the testimony of experts." L.A. Times, May 4, 1989, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4 (C.D.C. May 3,
1989). The prosecutor commented that this may prompt the Government to present expert
testimony in obscenity cases. Id.
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